

# PHILOSOPHY OF PROBABILITY

Contemporary Readings

Edited by  
*Antony Eagle*

# CONTENTS

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xi
<i>Preface</i>	xv
 Probability primer	 1
 <b>PART I</b>	
Degrees of belief	25
1 Introduction	27
2 'Truth and probability'	48
F. P. RAMSEY	
3 'Subjective probability: Criticisms, reflections and problems'	72
HENRY E. KYBURG, Jr.	
4 'A non-pragmatic vindication of probabilism'	89
JAMES M. JOYCE	
 <b>PART II</b>	
Updating degrees of belief: Conditionalisation and reflection	113
5 Introduction	115
6 'Why conditionalize?'	132
DAVID LEWIS	

## CONTENTS

7	'Probability kinematics'	135
	RICHARD C. JEFFREY	
8	'Belief and the will'	150
	BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN	
9	'Diachronic rationality'	166
	PATRICK MAHER	
10	'Self-locating belief and the sleeping beauty problem'	183
	ADAM ELGA	
11	'Some problems for conditionalization and reflection'	187
	FRANK ARNTZENIUS	
12	'When betting odds and credences come apart: More worries for Dutch book arguments'	199
	DARREN BRADLEY AND HANNES LEITGEB	
 <b>PART III</b>		
	<b>Evidence and probability: Bayesian confirmation theory</b>	<b>207</b>
13	Introduction	209
14	'Bayesian versus non-Bayesian approaches to confirmation'	222
	COLIN HOWSON AND PETER URBACH	
15	'Why I am not a Bayesian'	250
	CLARK GLYMOUR	
16	'Symmetries and asymmetries in evidential support'	268
	ELLERY EELLS AND BRANDEN FITELSON	
 <b>PART IV</b>		
	<b>Evidence and probability: Evidential probability and principles of indifference</b>	<b>279</b>
17	Introduction	281

## CONTENTS

18	'Indifference: The symmetries of probability'	296
	BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN	
19	'Statistical and inductive probability'	317
	RUDOLF CARNAP	
20	'Is the theory of logical probability groundless?'	327
	D. C. STOVE	
 <b>PART V</b>		
	<b>Physical Probability: The frequency theory</b>	<b>337</b>
21	Introduction	339
22	'The definition of probability'	355
	RICHARD VON MISES	
23	'Mises redux'	388
	RICHARD C. JEFFREY	
24	'“Mises redux”-redux: Fifteen arguments against finite frequentism'	395
	ALAN HÁJEK	
25	'Fifteen arguments against hypothetical frequentism'	410
	ALAN HÁJEK	
 <b>PART VI</b>		
	<b>Physical probability: Objective chance and propensities</b>	<b>433</b>
26	Introduction	435
27	'A subjectivist's guide to objective chance'	458
	DAVID LEWIS	
28	'The propensity interpretation of probability'	488
	KARL POPPER	

## CONTENTS

29	'Objective single-case probabilities and the foundations of statistics'	498
	RONALD N. GIERE	
30	'Why propensities cannot be probabilities'	511
	PAUL W. HUMPHREYS	
31	'David Lewis's humean theory of objective chance'	520
	BARRY LOEWER	
32	'Resiliency, propensities, and causal necessity'	529
	BRIAN SKYRMS	
	<i>Index</i>	537