

Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance

Amil Dasgupta

London School of Economics and Political Science
UK

a.dasgupta@lse.ac.uk

Vyacheslav Fos

Boston College
USA

fos@bc.edu

Zacharias Sautner

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Germany

z.sautner@fs.de

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