

Contents

1	Introduction	1
1.1	History and Philosophy of Science	1
1.2	Integrated History and Philosophy of Science	4
1.3	Integrated HPS in Practice: The Case of the Origin of Genetics	7
	References	9
 Part I History		
2	Mendel's <i>Pisum</i> Revisited	15
2.1	Mendel's Concern	15
2.2	Mendel and Gärtner on <i>Entwicklung</i> (Development)	16
2.3	Mendel's " <i>Entwicklungsreihe</i> (Developmental Series)"	24
2.4	Mendel's Novel Conceptualisation: The Laws of Developmental Series	27
2.5	Mendel and the Study of Heredity	30
2.6	Conclusion	33
	References	34
3	De Vries' Mendelism Reassessed	37
3.1	The Rediscovery Story	37
3.2	No Mendel, No Mendelians!	39
	3.2.1 The 3: 1 Ratio in the 1896 Notes	40
	3.2.2 Mendel and the Law of Segregation	42
3.3	De Vries' Introduction of Segregation	44
	3.3.1 From Mendel to Mendelism	44
	3.3.2 From Activeness to Dominance	45
	3.3.3 From Correspondence to Segregation	48
3.4	Conclusion	49
	References	50

4	Weldon's Choice Reconsidered	53
4.1	The Mendelian-Biometrician Controversy	53
4.2	Weldon as a Biometrician	54
4.3	Weldon's <i>Theory of Inheritance</i>	56
4.3.1	The Outline	57
4.3.2	The Methodology of the Study of Inheritance	58
4.3.3	The Aim of <i>Theory of Inheritance</i>	60
4.3.4	The Theory	61
4.3.5	Summary and Remarks	63
4.4	Weldon, No Biometrician?	64
4.4.1	Pearson vs. Weldon Reconsidered	64
4.4.2	Beyond Mendelism and Biometry	66
4.5	Conclusion	67
	References	67

Part II Integrated HPS

5	Exemplarising the Origin of Genetics	73
5.1	Introduction	73
5.2	The Theory-Based Accounts of the Origin of Genetics	74
5.3	The Kuhnian Accounts	80
5.4	A New Interpretation of Exemplar and the Exemplar-Based Approach	81
5.5	An Exemplar-Based Account of the Origin of Genetics	86
5.6	Conclusion	96
	References	97
6	A Functional Account of the Progress in Early Genetics	101
6.1	Scientific Progress and the Origin of Genetics	101
6.2	A New Functional Approach to Scientific Progress	102
6.3	How Early Genetics Progressed	104
6.4	The Problems of the Kuhn-Laudan Functional Approach Revisited	107
6.5	Beyond Knowledge, Truth, and Intervening	111
6.6	Conclusion	116
	References	116
7	The Problem of the Long Neglect Revisited: An Exemplar-Based Explanation	119
7.1	Two Problems of the Long Neglect	119
7.2	The Traditional Diagnoses of the Long Neglect	121
7.2.1	Explanation 1: Mendel's Work Was Not Accepted	121
7.2.2	Explanation 2: Mendel's Work Was Unknown	123
7.2.3	Summary and Remarks	124

7.3	Mendel's Contribution Reconsidered	125
7.3.1	The Traditional Philosophical Analyses	125
7.3.2	The Exemplar-Based Analysis	126
7.4	Why Mendel's Contribution Was Neglected	127
7.4.1	The Nature of the Long Neglect	127
7.4.2	The Exemplar-based Explanation	128
7.4.3	The Exemplar-Based Explanation and Old Intellectual Explanations	130
7.5	Conclusion	130
	References	131

Part III Philosophy

8	A New Mode of Conceptual Continuity	137
8.1	Conceptual Change: Variance and Continuity	137
8.2	What if Everything Changes? The Case of the Concept of Dominance	140
8.3	A Holistic Approach to Conceptual Change	146
8.4	Two Modes of Continuity and Conceptual Continuity	148
8.5	The Case of the Concept of Dominance Revisited	151
8.6	Conclusion	154
	References	155
9	The Gap Problem in Hypothetico-Deductivism	159
9.1	Mendel's Evidence and the Gap Problem	159
9.2	The Diagnosis of the Gap Problem and the Achinsteinian Solution	162
9.3	A New Solution: From Evidence to Evidential Practice	166
9.4	The Gap Problem Revisited	169
9.4.1	The Defence of Descriptive Adequacy	169
9.4.2	The Defence of Philosophical Adequacy	169
9.5	Normativity and Contextualism in H-D Evidential Practice	172
9.6	Conclusion	174
	References	174
10	Promisingness in Theory Choice	177
10.1	Theory Choice in Science	177
10.2	The Choices in the Mendelian-Biometrician Controversy	178
10.3	Promisingness as Potential Usefulness	181
10.4	Promisingness, Potential Progressiveness, Potential Fertility, and Fruitfulness	184
10.5	Argument from Normativity	189
10.6	Conclusion	189
	References	190

Appendix	193
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Index	195
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